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Abstract 
This study examines the role of occupational class in the Gender Wealth Gap (GWG). 
Despite rising interest in gender differences in wealth, the central role of occupations in 
restricting and enabling its accumulation has received less scrutiny thus far. Drawing on 
the German Socio-economic Panel, we employ quantile regressions and decomposition 
techniques. We find explanatory power of occupational class for the gender wealth gap, 
which operates despite accounting for other labour-market-relevant parameters, such as 
income, tenure, and full-time work experience at all points of the wealth distribution. 
Wealth gaps by gender vary between and within occupational classes. Particularly, 
women’s under-representation among the self-employed and over-representation among 
socio-cultural professions explain the GWG. Our study thus adds another dimension of 
stratification – occupational class – to the discussion on the gendered distribution of 
wealth.  
 











The gendered nature of economic inequality is a persistent phenomenon in many 
countries. Despite extensive research on gender differences in income and pay, the 
gender wealth gap (GWG) only recently gained more scrutiny from social scientists 
across various disciplines (Deere/Doss 2006; Grabka et al. 2015; Lersch et al. 2017; 
Ruel/Hauser 2013; Schneebaum et al. 2018; Sierminska et al. 2010).  
Wealth, however, is a central dimension of inequality as it represents current inequalities 
in income, property, and inheritance, as well as past inequalities over the life-course and 
across generations. Current levels of wealth are further driving future inequalities, since 
today’s investments in housing or private pensions impact future life and generations 
(Cowell et al. 2012; Piketty 2014). Therefore, inequalities in wealth can be more persistent 
than inequalities in income (Killewald et al. 2017) and add another layer to the gendered 
nature of economic inequalities in contemporary societies (Ruel/Hauser 2013).  
Rising interest in the GWG has led to a dynamic interdisciplinary field of research. Studies 
find that women’s lower levels of wealth are mostly attributable to lower lifetime earnings, 
discontinuous labour trajectories, and family obligations (e.g. Lersch 2017; Sierminska et 
al. 2010). Our study expands existing research by arguing that next to these well-
established determinants, women work in occupations that systematically restrict them 
from wealth accumulation.  
Previous research on the gender pay gap has shown that women cluster in precarious, 
low prestige and low-income occupations with high shares of part-time employment, 
which has led to a rise in wage inequalities between men and women (Blau/Kahn 2017; 
Minkus 2019). Given that the lion’s share of wealth is the result of savings from income 
(Killewald et al. 2017), we reason that women’s position in the occupational class 
structure does not only exacerbate gender wage differentials but also restricts women 
from wealth accumulation. Hence, the aim of our paper is to pursue an integrative 
approach studying three dimensions of inequality – gender, wealth, and occupational 
class – together. We assume that the association between these three dimensions varies 
along the wealth distribution – given the strong concentration of wealth at the top and the 
crucial role of gendered occupational segregation in wage dispersion. Therefore, we 
investigate gender differences in the wealth and their association with occupational 
classesi among the working population at different points of the wealth distribution in 
Germany.  
 
2. Gender Differences in Wealth 
Wealth is usually measured on the household level, therefore most papers investigating 
the GWG compare female-headed households with male-headed households (e.g. 
Ruel/Hauser 2013; Schneebaum et al. 2018; see also Deere and Doss 2006) as 









Existing studies on the GWG follow two overlapping lines of research. The first is 
concerned with family demographics. Studies pursuing this strand of research show that 
married women are wealthier than non-married women (Ruel/Hauser 2013) but 
accumulate less wealth than married men (Lersch 2017; Lersch et al. 2017) and face 
stronger disruptions when marriages dissolve (Addo/Lichter 2013; Warren et al. 2001). 
The timing and number of children further influences the GWG (Lersch et al. 2017; 
Ravazzini/Kuhn 2018; Yamokoski/Keister 2006).  
The second line of research points out that women’s lower endowment with human capital 
explains most of the GWG on the individual level (Sierminska et al. 2010; Sierminska et 
al. 2019) as well as on the household level (Ruel/Hauser 2013; Schneebaum et al. 2018). 
Discontinuous employment trajectories and lower (lifetime) earnings translate into lower 
wealth levels (e.g. Lersch et al. 2017; Ruel/Hauser 2013; Sierminska et al. 2010; 
Sierminska et al. 2019; Warren et al. 2001) but also education and asset ownership 
impact the GWG (Ravazzini/Chesters 2018; Schneebaum et al. 2018). 
However, research on the gender wage gap suggests that both mechanisms are 
intertwined, such that parenthood and care lead to employment breaks (Ehrlich et al. 
2019) that result in lower lifetime earnings (Boll 2011; Ehrlich et al. 2020) as well as lower 
saving rates and pensions entitlements (Conley/Ryvicker 2004; Sunden/Surette 1998; 
Warren et al. 2001). According to the permanent income hypothesis (Bewley 1977), 
individuals compensate for economic fluctuations by saving and dissaving wealth. Hence, 
wealth inequality between different groups is the result of differences in individual’s 
possibility to self-insure against earning shocks (De Nardi/Fella 2017).ii  
We believe that occupational classes are a missing link to explain these gender 
differences in saving wealth, because recent work on the gender wage differential 
suggests that pay differences between men and women are the result of rising 
occupational segregation (Blau/Kahn 2017; Minkus 2019; Minkus/Busch-Heizmann 
2020). Therefore, by integrating occupations into the analysis of wealth inequality, we 
propose an approach beyond contemporary research on the GWG. 
We argue that occupations aggregate toward something more than single labour market-
related components such as skill-level, average job tenure, work experience or income 
and significantly influence earnings net of job-characteristics or human capital (Blau/Kahn 
2017): Occupations capture past as well as future employment and income trajectories 
as well as associated risks, that are not fully accounted for by measures for current levels 
of income and employment status.iii   
Further, occupations differ in power resources that are not directly observable. Latent 
dimensions such as overall job securityiv, unionization, or strong lobby groups impact 
gender wealth differences just as much as they influence wage gaps. Occupations where 
women constitute the majority tend to have lower power resources to secure these latent 
dimensions, illustrated by e.g. lower levels of unionization (Minkus 2019) or lower 
additional allowances such as capital-forming benefits (Mohan/Ruggiero 2003) that in 
turn enable and restrict women to save and/or make long term-investment decisions into 
e.g. housing or stocks. 
 
 





3. Occupations and Wealth 
There is tentative evidence that occupational positions are important for the gendered 
accumulation of wealth (Sierminska et al. 2019; Warren 2006). The only quantitative study 
by Warren (2006) shows for the UK that gender, class, and ethnic differences in pension 
wealth exist and overlap – making a case for how different dimensions of stratification 
work together.  
Qualitative work shows that sons of elite classes inherit predominantly businesses equity 
whereas daughters are left with real estate of lower value (e.g. Bessière 2019), resulting 
in different starting levels for wealth accumulation among male and female heirs (though 
quantitative studies cannot map such gender difference in wealth, see Szydlik 2004). 
There is further evidence by Sierminska et al. (2019) that returns to occupational position 
explain part of the wealth gap and women’s increasing participation in white collar work 
has led to a slight attenuation of the GWG over time.  
While occupational positions are just control variables in most studies, we add to the 
literature by putting occupational class at the forefront of the analysis of gender wealth 
differences. For example, it is a well-established fact that self-employment is positively 
associated with wealth levels for both men and women (Sierminska et al. 2010), although 
self-employment comes with large income risks. However, men are more likely to be self-
employed and own a business, and – conditional on self-employment – the gender gap 
in wealth is especially large with regards to business assets (Edlund/Kopczuk 2009). This 
is because women are less likely to own and run large companies compared to men 
(Austen et al. 2014; Bertrand/Hallock 2001; Budig 2006) and use self-employment to 
substitute for part-time work and its better reconciliation capacities with family work 
(Georgellis/Wall 2005; Lechmann/Schnabel 2012).  
Therefore, women face lower power resource when being self-employed. Lower levels of 
and returns to self-employment have been explained by differences in risk-taking, 
however, empirical evidence is inconsistent at best (Schubert et al. 1999). Nelson (2016), 
for example, has shown in an re-examination of existing studies that the risk-distributions 
of men and women largely overlap (Nelson 2015).  
Next to gender wealth differences in self-employment, wealth gaps might exist in other 
occupational classes: women have entered higher professions in large numbers 
(Crompton 1987) but mainly occupy those in the socio-cultural sector and are less found 
in technical professions like engineers, that are usually higher paid (Oesch 2006: 275). 
Evidence from Sweden further suggests that women oftentimes cluster in dead-end 
occupations with lower career prospects (Bihagen/Ohls 2007) and henceforth face 
restrictions when taking out (secure) mortgages (Baker 2014).  
Further research has shown that managerial women report lower wages, are less likely 
to be paid in stock options, and their bonuses are smaller (Kulich et al. 2011; 
Mohan/Ruggiero 2003), which directly affects their capital income and wealth 
accumulation. In contrast, there might be occupational classes where restrictions to 
accumulate wealth are less pronounced for both men and women, for example, among 
the working classes with very low levels of wealth (Waitkus/Groh-Samberg 2018). While 
 
 





it seems straightforward that the lack of power resources (e.g. a higher probability to 
become unemployed, lower wages) correlates negatively with wealth levels, it could 
alternatively be the case that – conditional on income – women with lower power 
resources save at higher rates whilst expecting future income losses (Bewley 1977; De 
Nardi/Fella 2017), although women’s capacities for saving are much more restricted due 
to their lower levels of income. 
We want to know whether occupational classes help us to understand why wealth gaps 
still exist after controlling for differences in income, labour market experiences, and family 
obligations. We take the occupational structure at large into account and investigate the 
GWG across occupational classes among the working population at different points of 
the wealth distribution using an occupational class scheme.  
 
 
4. The Oesch Class Scheme  
In order to assess the importance of specific occupations for the gender wealth gap, the 
occupational class scheme chosen must meet two criteria: First, it must differentiate the 
occupational class structure at the top thoroughly, as wealth accumulation is mostly 
restricted to upper-middle classes in Germany (Waitkus/Groh-Samberg 2018). 
Additionally, wage differentials in leadership positions are particularly high (Calanca et al. 
2019; Minkus/Busch-Heizmann 2018) which in turn leads to discrepancies regarding 
saving wealth from income between men and women. Second, the occupational class 
scheme must capture gender differences that have arisen through the increasing 
feminization of labour markets (Crompton 1987; 1999) and consequently occupational 
segregation between men and women.  
To the best of our knowledge, the Oesch (2006) class scheme is the only in the class 
literature that accounts for the rising feminization of the labour force and hence captures 
those gender differences. What is more, its systematic differentiation of the top of the 
employment structure enables us to capture wealth differences by differentiating the 
broader higher professional groups into managerial occupations, technical experts and 
socio-cultural professionals (see Oesch 2006).  
The resulting class scheme (Table A.1) differentiates the self-employed from the 
employed groups to account for the well-acknowledged and persistently shown employer-
employee divide (for a discussion of the role of self-employment in the GWG see 
paragraph above). Vertically, classes are further differentiated according to the skill levels 
these jobs require. Horizontally, classes are differentiated according to work logics and 
the individual role in in the division of labour (Kriesi 1989; Oesch 2006). Following 
differences in work logics and skill levels between classes, we argue that incumbents of 
the different classes also face different capabilities to save. Exact mechanisms are laid 









Oesch (2006: 55) argues that managers are much more loyal towards their organisation 
as their job directly depends on the success of the organization they are employed with, 
resulting in a personal interest in profit maximation. Hence, we would expect managers 
to be more open towards private wealth accumulation since part of their remuneration 
may come as capital. In contrast, socio-cultural professionals (such as (university) 
teachers, journalists, or medical doctors and nurses) rely more on their skills, knowledge, 
and specialized training applied in a variety of contexts, which makes this group less 
reliant on a specific employer. Instead, socio-cultural professionals’ orientation is towards 
their professional group and the autonomy of their discipline (Oesch 2006; see also Kriesi 
1989). Therefore, we argue that socio-cultural professionals might be less prone to private 
wealth accumulation and profit maximization and instead rely more on their income-
generating skills.v Technical experts (such as engineers and computer professionals) 
could be in an intermediate position between managers and socio-cultural professionals 
regarding levels of wealth.  
Given that women occupy different occupational groups compared to men (they are 
overrepresented among socio-cultural professions und underrepresented among 
technical experts) that come with different power resources, payment, and orientations 
towards wealth accumulation (Crompton 1987; Oesch 2006: 275), we suspect between-
class inequalities to moderate the GWG.  
Wealth differences between occupational classes could be further stratified by gender 
differences within occupational classes: as mentioned, female managers are paid less 
often in stock options (Mohan/Ruggiero 2003), leading to overall lower levels of wealth 
among female managers compared to male managers. Though women are 
overrepresented among socio-cultural professions, they might cluster just in these in 
dead-end occupations with lower career prospects (Bihagen/Ohls 2007), which keep 
women back from long-term investments such as taking out (secure) mortgages (Baker 
2014). In contrast, male socio-cultural professionals might have higher wealth levels than 
their female counterparts, as they occupy the best-paid positions within this group (e.g. 
Bertrand/Hallock 2001). The role of occupational class in the GWG is therefore twofold: 
First, women and men are horizontally allocated within different occupational classes that 
differ in their inclination to accumulate wealth. Second, gender inequalities exist within 
occupational classes e.g. when female managers are less likely to be paid in stock 
options than male managers.  
While the Oesch scheme captures differences in gender composition across classes 
(Table A.1 and Table A.2 include an overview) and explains differences in income and 
earnings, pension system integration and political orientations (see Gingrich/Häusermann 
2015; Oesch 2006; 2008) its capacity to explain wealth differences is yet to be explored 
(Lambert/Bihagen 2014; but see Waitkus/Groh-Samberg (2018) for descriptive 
evidence). In what follows, we will investigate to what extent Oesch classes are 
associated with the GWG. As we suspect the association to vary across the wealth 










5. Analytical Approach 
We test the association between gender, wealth, and occupational class using Germany 
as our case study. Germany remains a crucial case in wealth research as levels of 
inequality are higher than in any other Eurozone country (Grabka/Westermeier 2014; 
Pfeffer/Waitkus 2020), due to low average levels of wealth resulting from historically low 
home ownership rates (Kurz 2004). Additionally, a comparatively encompassing social 
insurance system renders wealth accumulation less necessary for old-age security than 




We employ data from the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP was initiated in 1984 
in West-Germany and expanded to East Germany in 1990. All household members 17 
years and older are interviewed on a yearly basis. The survey covers more than 30,000 
individuals in over 15,000 households (Goebel et al. 2019). including information on 
socio-economic resources and different components of wealth. A detailed wealth module 
permits an in-depth analysis of individual (and household) wealth (Frick et al. 2010).vi The 
wealth module includes high-quality data on net wealth and other assets. Individual 
wealth is provided in five replicates, following extensive and demanding imputation by the 
SOEP team to account for item non-response and underreporting (Frick et al. 2010). To 
account for the five replicates and their repeated observations, we employ Rubin’s rule 
(1996) for estimating standard errors using the stata command mi estimate and average 




We use all available wealth data and pool the respective years (2002, 2007, 2012 and 
2017) as levels of wealth inequality have been persistently high (Grabka/Halbmeier 
2019). We restrict our sample to the working population between 20 to 64 years, living in 
private households. Since our central independent variable is occupational class, we 
restrict our sample to those who do not have missing information on the class measure. 
Our final sample size consists of 20.462 observations for women (N=12.442) and 20.620 




Our central dependent variable is individual net wealth, defined as the sum of all financial 
and real assets minus liabilities. Given that the net wealth can be negative or zero, we 
apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to our wealth measures (Pence 2006). 
This transformation allows for the inclusion of zero and negative values (Gale/Pence 
 
 





2006; Schneebaum et al. 2018). Wealth data are top and bottom-coded at the .1 and 99.9 
percentile and inflation adjusted in constant 2015€.  
Our central independent measure is occupational class, operationalized as a collapsed 
version of the Oesch class scheme (Oesch 2006). While Oesch’s version includes eight 
occupational classes (Table A.1), we further collapse the working classes into one group 
for our main analysis, due to the low levels of net wealth among them (Table A.2). The 
main model includes six occupational classes, i.e. self-employed, technical professionals, 
managers, socio-cultural professionals, and workers (Table 2). To account for 
heterogeneity within self-employed groups (e.g. Müller/Arum 2004), we run an additional 
robust check with a class scheme that differentiates the self-employed into large 
employers, self-employed professionals, and the petite bourgeoisie (see Figure A.1). 
However, numbers of observations are very low (see Table A.2) which is why our main 
analysis refrains from such a differentiation. 
While occupational class is our central concern, we further control for economic indicators 
that correlate with gender differences in wealth, such as human capital indicators and 
household characteristics. We control for individual income by including inflation-adjusted 
(2015€) monthly and ihs-transformed individual income from work, income from pensions 
(which includes all kinds of occupational and private pensions), and income from transfers 
(which includes all kinds of social security benefits like child allowances, housing support, 
or disability allowance). We further account for years of full- and part-time work 
experience and tenure (years), as well as weekly hours worked. Additionally, 
unemployment experience and education in years is included. Furthermore, we account 
for workplace characteristics, such as sectoral structurevii, working in the public sector, 
and firm size. Moreover, we account for inheritance by including a dummy indication 
having received an inheritance or giftviii. We further account for the partner’s occupational 
class (measured as self-employed, professionals, (skilled and unskilled) workers, non-
working partner, no information for partner. Additionally, we introduce variables indicating 
family traits. Marital status is categorized into being married and cohabiting, married and 
separated, non-married, divorced, and widowed. We further add the number of children 
living in the respondent’s household, the number of siblings, as well as the highest 
parental education to account for the social background (Pfeffer and Killewald 2017). We 
control for migration background to account for migrants’ lower wealth accumulation and 
we implement a dummy for the region as there is still a considerable economic gap 
between East and West Germany (Minkus/Busch-Heizmann 2020). Age is included in 
categories (20-34, 35-49, 50-64 years). Since we work with a pooled sample, we add 
yearly dummies to control for yearly confounders. Lastly, we control for the imputation 









Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Women  Men   Δ means  
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev (men-
women) 
Explained Variable      
Wealth (IHS) 8.087 6.73 8.462 7.031 -0.38*** 
Explanatory Variables      
Class position       
Self-employed 0.05 0.22 0.087 0.28 0.03*** 
Technical experts 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.37 0.11*** 
Managers 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 -0.02*** 
Socio-cultural prof. 0.23 0.42 0.08 0.27 -0.15*** 
Workers 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.02*** 
Class position (Partner)      
Self-employed 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.20 -0.03*** 
Professionals 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.02*** 
Workers 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.00 
Not working 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.12*** 
No Info 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.43 -0.11*** 
Transfers      
No inheritance/gifts  0.90 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.00 
Inheritance/gifts 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.00 
Inheritance/gifts not applicable 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 -0.00 
Human capital and income      
Monthly labour income (IHS) 7.65 0.88 8.31 0.75 0.67*** 
Monthly transfer income (IHS) 0.79 2.13 0.28 1.31 -0.51*** 
Monthly pension income (IHS) 0.20 1.23 0.11 0.92 -0.09*** 
Full-time work experience (years) 11.7 9.97 19.9 11.1 8.18*** 
Part-time work experience (years) 6.21 7.12 0.77 2.25 -5.44*** 
Unemployment (years) 0.73 1.97 0.54 1.61 -0.20*** 
Job Tenure (years) 10.0 9.63 12.0 10.5 1.99*** 
Weekly work hours 31.5 12.9 43.7 9.94 12.22*** 
Education (years) 12.9 2.63 12.8 2.79 -0.01 
Firm size      
< 20 employees and self-
employed w/o employees 
0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43 -0.07*** 
20-199 employees 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.00 
200-1999 employees 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.02*** 
> 2000 employees 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.05*** 
Sectoral structure      
Public sector(=1) 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.41 -0.10*** 
Health, social, retail, and 
hospitality sector 
0.50 0.50 0.17 0.38 -0.33*** 
Bank and insurance sector 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 -0.00 
Manufacturing sector 0.16 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.30*** 
Other services 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.03*** 
Family      
# children in household  0.80 1.01 0.92 1.13 0.12*** 
Married and cohabiting  0.60 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.08*** 
 
 





Married and living separately 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 -0.01*** 
Non-married 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.01 
Divorced 0.13 0.33 0.07 0.25 -0.06*** 
Widowed 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 -0.02*** 
# siblings 1.87 1.56 1.95 1.69 0.08*** 
Parental education      
No degree/don't know/else 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.02*** 
Low education 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 
Intermediate education 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 -0.02*** 
Higher education 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 -0.01 
Controls      
East Germany (=1) 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 -0.01** 
Migration background (=1) 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.01*** 
Age (20 - 34 years) 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 -0.00 
Age (35 - 49 years) 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.50 -0.01* 
Age (50 - 64 years) 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.01** 
Wealth imputation flag (=1) 0.84 0.95 0.77 0.93 -0.07*** 
Year dummies      
2002  0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.03*** 
2007  0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.02*** 
2012  0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 -0.01** 
2017  0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44 -0.03*** 
Number of person-years 20.462 20.620  
N of persons 12.442 12.220  






We employ pooled unconditional quantile regressions and decompositions at the 25th 
percentile, the median, the 75th percentile, and the 90th percentile. Following Firpo et al. 
(2009), unconditional quantile regression assesses the explanatory variable’s – here 
occupational class and gender – association with the quantile of the unconditional 
marginal distribution of net wealth. In unconditional quantile models, the Recentred 
Influence Function (RIF) is applied (Firpo et al. 2009; Fortin et al. 2011: 74 ff.) that is 




With τ indicating a quantile of the marginal distribution of wealth and q is the value of 
wealth at quantile τ. Hence, the coefficient τ estimates how fy reacts to changes in the 









To investigate in how far different compositions as opposed to different point estimates 
for different coefficients to these characteristics between men and women drive the GWG, 
we employ Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at different points of the 
unconditional wealth distribution (Blinder 1973; Jann 2008; Kitagawa 1955; Oaxaca 
1973). Equation 2 displays the decomposition that includes two components:  
 
∆𝑚−𝑓 = (?̅?𝑚 −  ?̅?𝑓) = (?̅?𝑚 −  ?̅?𝑓)?̂?𝑚 +  ?̅?𝑓(?̂?𝑚 −  ?̂?𝑓),   (2) 
 
where ∆𝑚−𝑓  refers to the average (RIF) wealth difference between men and women. This 
wealth difference is decomposed into the “explained” ((?̅?𝑚 −  ?̅?𝑓)?̂?𝑚) and “unexplained” 
term (𝑋̅̅ ̅𝑓(?̂?𝑚 −  ?̂?𝑓)).  
The “explained” term refers to the part of the gender wealth gap that is relegated to 
different endowments between men and women (i.e., if self-employment is associated 
with a wealth penalty and women are less often self-employed than men; how does this 
difference affect the GWG?). The “unexplained” term refers to differences in coefficients 
between men and women (i.e., if self-employment poses higher wealth penalties for 
women compared to men, how does that affect the wealth gap?). Since coefficients of 
the unexplained part contain all sorts of unmeasured attributes and henceforth might 
reflect spurious effects due to the omitted variable bias (c.f. Blau/Kahn 2017), we are 
predominantly interested in the explained part of the decomposition. Men’s coefficients 
serve as the benchmark for the decomposition. We also run robustness checks to test if 
our results hold when women are the reference for the decomposition (Figure A.5).  
Although a decomposition across the wealth distribution largely resembles the logic of a 
regular decomposition, there is one peculiarity: for the estimation, the same descriptive 
differences are used across the wealth distribution. This means if, for instance, on 
average men are more often self-employed in our sample than women, the decomposition 
will use this difference to estimate the explained part of the decomposition across all the 
points of the wealth distribution. Hence, it does not consider that the difference in self-
employment might be diverging across the wealth distribution. Thus, differences in the 
explained part of the decomposition are driven by diverging coefficients form the pooled 
benchmark model at different parts of the wealth distribution. Additionally, we account for 
the fact that categorical coefficients depend on the choice of the reference group , by 
using the categorical option provided by the oaxaca stata command (Jann 2008). We 
normalize coefficients by estimating them in terms of deviation from the grand-mean 
rather than deviations from the omitted base category and can thereby circumvent the 












6.1 Descriptive Results 
 
We start with simple descriptive results. Table 2 shows that median wealth is higher for 
men than for women across the occupational class structure, and these differences are 
significant in all occupational classes.  
 
 
Table 2. Wealth Gap within classes 






N (men) N (women) 
Self-employed 165,196 80,314 84,881*** 1800 1075 
Technical experts 70,997 58,093 12,904* 3326 1182 
Manager 90,166 41,189 48,977*** 3976 4278 
Socio-cultural prof. 58,744 36,204 22,539*** 1605 4623 
Worker 15,864 12,394 3,470*** 9877 9304 
SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. Not weighted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
However, there are important differences in size: While the wealth gap amounts to 
85,000€ among the self-employed, the gap becomes smaller in lower occupational 
groups and is only around 3,500€ among workers. The second-largest gap is found 
among managers, where women report less than half of the levels of wealth than men – 
although more than a half of all managers are female. In contrast, among technical 
professionals the wealth gap is comparably low (13.000€). Hence, those few women who 
are technical experts report median levels of wealth that are not too distant from men’s 
median levels of wealth – at least compared to other occupational classes. The picture is 
very different among socio-cultural professionals: while women mark the large majority in 
this occupational class (73%) their median levels are almost 23.000€ lower compared to 
men within the same occupational group. 
While these descriptive results suggest that gender wealth differences exist across all 
occupational classes, these insights do not reliably tell us whether these differences 
persist when we control for human capital indicators, family structure, and other 
confounders. We run unconditional quantile regression to understand if occupational 










6.2 Unconditional Quantile Regression 
 
Unconditional quantile (“rifreg”) regressions are displayed in Figure 1 (full regression 
results are depicted in Table A.3) describing the association between occupational class 
with the unconditional wealth distribution at the 25th percentile, the median, the 75th, and 
the 90th percentile for men and womenix.  
Figure 1 illustrates a clear positive association between self-employment and wealth for 
women and men at all points of the wealth distribution (reference is workers)x. The Figure 
also illustrates that men seem to profit slightly more from being self-employed than 
women do. Still, gender differences are only statistically different at the 75th and 90th 
percentile (see respective confidence intervals). In contrast, gender differences are not 
significantly different at the bottom and middle of the distribution (25th and 50th percentile, 
as indicated by overlapping confidence intervals)xi. 
 
Figure 1. Results from unconditional quantile regressions (only occupational classes)  
Note: SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. (cf. Table A.3). Not weighted 
 
Investigating other occupational classes, we observe a significant positive association 
between being technical experts and wealth for women and men at the 25th percentile, 
the median, and the 75th percentile of the wealth distribution. Only at the median, 
however, the association for female technical professionals is statistically different from 
 
 





the coefficient for men, indicating that being a technical expert is more positively 
associated with wealth for women compared to men.  
Being a manager is positively associated with wealth across the entire wealth distribution 
for men and women alike. Coefficients, however, do not significantly differ for men and 
women, therefore, men and women seem to profit equally from being a manager 
compared to the reference group (workers) at all points of the wealth distribution. Lastly, 
socio-cultural professionals yield significant positive associations with the unconditional 
wealth distribution – compared to workers – in all but the 90th percentile. Overall, men 
and women seem to profit equally in terms of wealth from being a socio-cultural 
professional compared to being a worker.  
Investigating the control variables (we only discuss results at the median, see Table A.3), 
regression results reveal that partner’s class is associated with the wealth distribution for 
women and men. We also find that women experience wealth losses when they have a 
partner who is not in employment, for men this association is not significant. These results 
thus indicate the lasting importance of the male breadwinner model, i.e., men working 
full-time and women being the secondary earner or homemaker. Inheritance is also 
positively associated with wealth for both, men, and women. Labour income and full-time 
work experience, as well as unemployment experience, education, and job tenure are 
positively associated with men’s and women’s wealth accumulation. In contrast, 
compared to working in the banking and insurance sector, working in health, retail, and 
hospitality sector or other services is negatively associated with wealth while 
manufacturing is positively associated with the wealth distribution for men and women. 
Having children is positively associated with wealth for men and women alike, whereas, 
compared to being married and cohabiting, being divorced or not married is detrimental 
for women’s and men’s wealth. A higher number of siblings negatively influences wealth 
accumulation for men and women. Parents not having any degree is negatively 
associated with wealth levels, and so is being from East Germany and having a migration 




Turning to the decomposition analysis, we see that the explanatory capacity of our 
occupational class covariates varies across the distribution (Figure 2 and Table 3). 
However, occupational class adds to explaining the GWG at all points of the wealth 
distribution, though with different sizes and in different directions.  
Figure 2 depicts the explained part of the decomposition for occupational classes. Overall, 
occupational classes explain between 7-18% of the wealth gap, depending on the 
percentile of the distribution in the explained part of the decomposition investigated. 
Different occupational class coefficients for men and women explain between 5 and -45% 










Figure 2. Explained part of the decomposition, only Oesch classes and explained 
percentages depicted. 
 
Note: SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 (cf. Table 3). Not weighted.  
 
We first turn to the explained part of the decomposition. We find that the explanatory 
capacity of self-employment is largest at the top of the wealth distribution. In fact, the 
gendered composition of self-employment explains about 18% of the GWG between men 
and women at the 90th percentile and about 13% at the 75th percentile.  
In contrast, the composition of technical experts does not significantly influence the GWG 
at the 25th and 50th percentile, while at the 75th and the 90th percentile this occupational 
class attenuates the GWG by about 5 and 10%, respectively. Men are more often 
employed as technical experts than women, which depresses the GWG since the 
association between wealth and being a technical expert turn negative at the upper two 
points of the wealth distribution investigated (results not shown, obtained using the 
categorical option of the oaxaca commandxii (Jann 2008). Hence, if women were as often 










Table 3. Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-Decompositions 
 
 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Men 8.933*** (0.056)  11.404*** (0.022)  12.601*** (0.013)  13.311*** (0.015)  
Women 8.289*** (0.070)  10.881*** (0.026)  12.302*** (0.014)  12.998*** (0.013)  
Difference 0.644*** (0.089)  0.523*** (0.034)  0.300*** (0.020)  0.313*** (0.020)  
Explained 1.966*** (0.157)  0.922*** (0.056)  0.475*** (0.033)  0.429*** (0.039)  
Unexplained -1.322*** (0.174)  -0.399*** (0.063)  -0.175*** (0.036)  -0.116** (0.041)  
Explained             
Class 0.044 (0.036) 6.8 0.052 (0.014) 9.9 0.040 (0.010) 13.4 0.057 (0.011) 18.1 
Self-employed 0.032*** (0.006) 5.0 0.026*** (0.003) 5.1 0.028*** (0.003) 9.3 0.043*** (0.004) 13.7 
Technical experts 0.019 (0.012) 2.9 0.000 (0.005) 0.1 -0.014*** (0.003) -4.8 -0.032*** (0.004) -10.1 
Manager -0.003 (0.002) -0.4 -0.001 (0.001) -0.1 0.001 (0.001) 0.4 0.004*** (0.001) 1.2 
Socio-cult. prof. 0.023 (0.027) 3.5 0.039*** (0.010) 7.5 0.035*** (0.007) 11.6 0.051*** (0.008) 16.2 
Workers -0.027*** (0.006) -4.2 -0.013*** (0.003) -2.5 -0.009*** (0.002) -3.0 -0.009*** (0.002) -2.9 
Partner's Occ. Class -0.065** (0.024) -10.1 -0.045*** (0.009) -8.5 -0.015* (0.006) -5.1 -0.014* (0.007) -4.4 
Human capital 1.653*** (0.154) 257 0.782*** (0.054) 150 0.387*** (0.031) 129 0.345*** (0.037) 110 
Workplace 0.301*** (0.055) 46.8 0.067** (0.021) 12.8 0.031* (0.013) 10.2 0.024 (0.014) 7.7 
Family 0.121*** (0.023) 18.9 0.078*** (0.009) 14.8 0.026*** (0.006) 8.7 0.006 (0.007) 2.0 
Controls -0.089*** (0.018) -13.8 -0.012* (0.006) -2.3 0.006 (0.004) 2.1 0.011** (0.003) 3.4 
Unexplained             
Class -0.048 (0.074) -7.4 0.028 (0.029) 5.4 -0.065 (0.018) -21.6 -0.140 (0.20) -44.7 
Self-employed 0.003 (0.016) 0.5 0.010 (0.006) 1.9 0.021*** (0.004) 7.0 0.039*** (0.005) 12.6 
Technical experts 0.001 (0.014) 0.1 -0.022*** (0.006) -4.2 -0.010** (0.003) -3.5 -0.012** (0.004) -3.9 
Manager 0.009 (0.035) 1.4 0.029* (0.014) 5.6 -0.004 (0.009) -1.3 -0.036*** (0.011) -11.5 
Socio-cult. prof. 0.005 (0.053) 0.8 0.013 (0.020) 2.5 -0.020 (0.013) -6.7 -0.035* (0.015) -11.3 
Workers -0.066 (0.078) -10.2 -0.002 (0.030) -0.4 -0.052** (0.017) -17.2 -0.096*** (0.018) -30.6 
Partner's Occ. Class -0.083 (0.062) -12.9 -0.010 (0.024) -2.0 0.001 (0.015) 0.4 0.012 (0.019) 4.0 
Human capital 2.042 (1.280) 317 2.393*** (0.433) 458 1.869*** (0.270) 623 1.612*** (0.337) 515 
Workplace 0.057 (0.096) 8.8 0.007 (0.039) 1.4 -0.008 (0.025) -2.6 -0.018 (0.027) -5.8 
Family -0.040 (0.240) -6.3 0.050 (0.096) 9.6 0.015 (0.056) 5.1 0.007 (0.065) 2.2 
Controls -0.465* (0.200) -72.2 -0.013 (0.077) -2.6 0.015 (0.044) 4.9 0.031 (0.047) 9.9 
Constant -2.785* (1.394)  -2.854*** (0.471)  -2.003*** (0.290)  -1.620*** (0.357)  
Number of person-years 41.082 41.082 41.082 41.082 
Number of persons 24.662 24.662 24.662 24.662 
SOEP.V35; 2002, 2007, 2012; robust standard errors in parentheses. Not weighted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Categorical option employed (mean over occupational class categories). 
 
 





The explanatory capacity of managerial occupations is virtually non-existent: only at 
the 90th percentile being a manager significantly explains as little as 1.2% of the GWG. 
This is not surprising given that women and men are equally often managers (Table 
2), and the association with the wealth distribution does not differ significantly (Figure 
1).  
Working in socio-cultural professions exacerbates the GWG across the distribution but 
particularly at the top by as much as 16% and even at the 75th percentile about 12%. 
Thus, working in a socio-cultural profession does not only come about with penalties 
to wealth accumulation (i.e., the benchmark coefficient in the decomposition), but the 
over-representation of women significantly widens the gender gap in wealth at the top 
of the wealth distribution. In contrast, low-wealth occupational classes such as workers 
seem to – slightly – attenuate the GWG, indicating that the association between wealth 
and being a worker is negative. This gives the marginally underrepresented women a 
slight advantage in wealth accumulation in this group.  
Overall, occupational class does add to explaining the GWG: Particularly, the 
underrepresentation of women among the self-employed and their overrepresentation 
among socio-cultural professions add to explaining the GWG. In contrast, the 
gendered composition of technical experts attenuates the GWG, whereas managers 
do not add any explanatory power for the GWG.  
Briefly investigating the unexplained part of the decomposition analyses (Table 3), 
shows that the association between wealth and occupational class is further stratified: 
self-employment seems to be particularly beneficiary at the top of the unconditional 
wealth distribution for men, hence, if women would profit equally, the gap would be 
smaller. For socio-cultural professionals, we see the negative association for women 
depresses the GWG. In fact, women’s penalties are not as high as men’s, which is 
leading towards closing the GWG. This could reflect a general devaluation of socio-
cultural professions that depresses wealth levels for men and women alike. Given, 
however, that women are overrepresented in this occupational class, being a socio-
cultural professional is particularly detrimental for their wealth. In contrast, technical 
experts stand out with a different direction of the association: women have lower 
penalties for being a technical expert compared to men as the unexplained coefficient 
is negative and significant at the 25th, the median, and the 90th percentile. The same 
holds true for being a worker. 
Overall, class adds to explaining the overall GWG. Investigating other confounders, 
however, illustrates that the explanatory capacity of class is smaller than the pooled 
human capital variables (i.e., income from work, transfers, pensions, unemployment, 
full-time and part-time work experience, weekly working hours, education, 
inheritance/gifts, and tenure, see Table 3). Nonetheless, Table 3 shows that at the 75th 
percentile, gender composition of occupational classes accounts for about 13% of the 
explained GWG, which is more than workplace characteristics (10%, i.e., firm size, 
public sector, and sectoral structure), partner’s class (-5%) and family traits (9%, i.e. 
marital status, parental education, number of siblings, children). Given that 
occupational class further correlates with human capital indicators, some of the 
 
 





explanatory power of occupational class is already taken up by other control variables 
emphasizing how important the role occupation class in the GWG is irrespective of 
human capital indicators. 
 
6.4 Robustness Checks 
 
To test the robustness of our results, we ran four additional estimations.  
First, we excluded business equity from the dependent variable to check whether this 
alters the results, i.e., we analyze the importance of portfolio structure on the gender 
wealth gap (Figure A.2). Except for the 25th percentile, results are similar. However, 
there is one crucial difference: The association with self-employment for men drops 
sharply in the 90th percentile and attenuates a bit for women as well, meaning that 
self-employed men tend to accumulate more wealth through business equity compared 
to women.  
Second, we checked whether SES could serve as an informative proxy for occupation. 
SES is a measure for occupational status that varies between 16 (e.g. cleaners) and 
90 (judges) (Ganzeboom et al. 1992) and is usually divided into three equally sized 
groups (high SES, middle and low SES) which – compared to the Oesch class scheme 
– is an artificial and not a theoretically grounded difference. Figure A.3 further illustrates 
that SES is not a useful proxy, as results are not significantly different for men and 
women. Hence, SES measures masks important differences in the association 
between gender, wealth, and occupations. 
Third, we checked whether our results hold for non-married men and women compared 
to married individuals (Figure A.4). We find that the positive association of self-
employment and wealth at the 75th and 90th percentile is not statistically different for 
unmarried individuals, while it is for the married.  
Fourth, to account for the fact that we chose men’s benchmark coefficients in the 
decomposition, we ran another decomposition in which we used women’s coefficients 
as the reference (Figure A.5). Not surprisingly, we find that the association between 
self-employment and socio-cultural professionals with wealth at the 75th and 90th 
percentile is smaller compared to our main model (Figure 2).  
 
 
7. Summary and Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the Gender Wealth Gap taking occupational 
class into account. The results illustrate that integrating a class perspective in the study 
of gendered wealth inequalities yields interesting insights, and we show that classes 
explain more of the gender wealth gap at different points of the wealth distribution, than 









We conclude with two main takeaways. First, the GWG varies substantially across 
occupational groups and is largest among the self-employed and managers. This is 
because women run smaller companies and are making less wealth from this, 
indicating lower power resources in self-employment compared to men. Further, 
although women are equally often managers, they tend to occupy lower wealth-
generating positions. However, even in female-dominated occupational classes such 
as socio-cultural professions the gap is large and profound pointing to large differences 
in power resources and possibly indicating that men hold the more attractive positions 
among the socio-cultural professions compare to women that turn into differences in 
wealth. In sum, particularly women’s under-representation among the self-employed 
and over-representation among socio-cultural professions add to explain the GWG in 
Germany. 
Second, despite this additional explanatory capacity of occupational class, the largest 
impact on the GWG still comes from income and work experience. The decomposition 
analysis revealed that lower full-time work-experience and income are the main drivers 
of the overall GWG, results that are well in line with previous research (Ruel/Hauser 
2013; Sierminska et al. 2010). This is not surprising, given that income becomes wealth 
when it is saved (Killewald et al. 2017), and we assume that part of the association 
between wealth and occupational class is already taken up by our control variables, as 
occupational classes differ and are constituted by e.g. income, education, or tenure.  
Clearly, our analysis comes with some limitations. We follow the big-class tradition, 
and we cannot account for intra-class differences. Additional analysis using 
occupations might show how specific occupations drive the GWG. This could 
particularly pertain to socio-cultural professionals, where a diverse set of occupations 
are grouped together that vary in power resources towards their employer. However, 
we leave this to future research.  
Further, given the cross-sectional character of this study, we cannot state anything 
about the association’s direction between occupational class and wealth accumulation. 
More specifically, selection into self-employment could be the result of previous levels 
of wealth (Fairlie/Krashinsky 2012). Future research should further tackle the gendered 
nature of self-employment and the devaluation of female occupations such as socio-
cultural professions. Women are less likely to become self-employed in the first place, 
and when they are, businesses are smaller, and wealth levels are lower (Austen et al. 
2014; Georgellis/Wall 2005).  
What is more, women’s lower levels of wealth are further the result of the systematic 
devaluation of female occupations, restricting women from accumulating as much 
wealth as men do. Though women are oftentimes key workers – as currently 
exemplified in the COVID-19 pandemic – the systematic devaluation and lack of power 
resources restrict women from keeping up with male levels of income and wealth. 
When gender differences in labour markets and pay are overcome, we are one 
significant step closer to ending gender differences in wealth.   
 
 





Bibliography   
Addo, Fenaba R, and Daniel T Lichter. 2013. "Marriage, marital history, and black–white 
wealth differentials among older women." Journal of Marriage and Family, 75(2): 342-
62. 
Austen, Siobhan, Therese Jefferson, and Rachel Ong. 2014. "The gender gap in financial 
security: What we know and don't know about Australian households." Feminist 
Economics, 20(3): 25-52. 
Baker, Amy Castro. 2014. "Eroding the wealth of women: Gender and the subprime 
foreclosure crisis." Social Service Review, 88(1): 59-91. 
Bertrand, Marianne, and Kevin F Hallock. 2001. "The gender gap in top corporate jobs." ILR 
Review, 55(1): 3-21. 
Bessière, Céline. 2019. "Reversed accounting: legal professionals, families and the gender 
wealth gap in France." Socio-Economic Review, Forthcoming. 
Bewley, Truman. 1977. "The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation." 
Journal of economic theory, 16: 252-92. 
Bihagen, Erik, and Marita Ohls. 2007. "Are women over-represented in dead-end jobs? A 
Swedish study using empirically derived measures of dead-end jobs." Social 
Indicators Research, 84(2): 159-77. 
Blau, Francine D, and Lawrence M Kahn. 2017. "The gender wage gap: Extent, trends, and 
explanations." Journal of Economic Literature, 55(3): 789-865. 
Blinder, Alan S. 1973. "Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural estimates." Journal 
of Human Resources, 8(4): 436-55. 
Boll, Christina. 2011. "Mind the gap—German motherhood risks in figures and game theory 
issues." International Economics and Economic Policy, 8(4): 363-82. 
Borah, Bijan J, and Anirban Basu. 2013. "Highlighting differences between conditional and 
unconditional quantile regression approaches through an application to assess 
medication adherence." Health Economics, 22(9): 1052-70. 
Budig, Michelle J. 2006. "Intersections on the road to self-employment: Gender, family and 
occupational class." Social Forces, 84(4): 2223-39. 
Calanca, Federica, Luiza Sayfullina, Lara Minkus, Claudia Wagner, and Eric Malmi. 2019. 
"Responsible team players wanted: an analysis of soft skill requirements in job 
advertisements." EPJ Data Science, 8(1): 1-20. 
Conley, Dalton, and Miriam Ryvicker. 2004. "The price of female headship: Gender, 
inheritance, and wealth accumulation in the United States." Journal of Income 
Distribution, 13(3/4): 41-56. 
Cowell, Frank, Eleni Karagiannaki, and Abigail McNight. 2012. "Mapping and Measuring the 
Distribution of Household Wealth: A Cross-Country Analysis." LWS Working Paper 
Series, 12. 
Crompton, Rosemary. 1987. "Gender, status and professionalism." Sociology, 21(3): 413-28. 
Crompton, Rosemary. 1999. "The gendered restructuring of the middle classes: employment 
and caring." The Sociological Review, 47(2): 165-83. 
De Nardi, Mariacristina, and Giulio Fella. 2017. "Saving and wealth inequality." Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 26: 280-300. 
Deere, Carmen Diana, and Cheryl R Doss. 2006. "The gender asset gap: What do we know 
and why does it matter?" Feminist Economics, 12(1-2): 1-50. 
Edlund, Lena, and Wojciech Kopczuk. 2009. "Women, wealth, and mobility." American 
Economic Review, 99(1): 146-78. 
Ehrlich, Ulrike, Lara Minkus, and Moritz Hess. 2020. "Einkommensrisiko Pflege? Der 
Zusammenhang von familiärer Pflege und Lohn." Zeitschrift für Gerontologie und 
Geriatrie, 53(1): 22-28. 
Ehrlich, Ulrike, Katja Möhring, and Sonja Drobnič. 2019. "What comes after caring? The 
impact of family care on women’s employment." Journal of Family Issues, Online first. 
Fairlie, Robert W, and Harry A Krashinsky. 2012. "Liquidity constraints, household wealth, 
and entrepreneurship revisited." Review of Income and Wealth, 58(2): 279-306. 
 
 





Firpo, Sergio, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 2009. "Unconditional quantile regression." 
Econometrica, 77(3): 953-73. 
Fortin, Nicole, Thomas Lemieux, and Sergio Firpo. 2011. "Decomposition Methods in 
Economics." In Handbook of Labour Economics, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and 
David Card, pp. 1-102. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Frick, Joachim R, Markus M Grabka, and Jan Marcus. 2010. "Editing und multiple Imputation 
der Vermögensinformation 2002 und 2007 im SOEP." SOEP Survey Papers, 146. 
Gale, William G, and Karen M Pence. 2006. "Are successive generations getting wealthier, 
and if so, why? Evidence from the 1990s." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
2006(1): 155-234. 
Ganzeboom, Harry BG, Paul M De Graaf, and Donald J Treiman. 1992. "A standard 
international socio-economic index of occupational status." Social science research, 
21(1): 1-56. 
Georgellis, Yannis, and Howard J Wall. 2005. "Gender differences in self‐employment." 
International review of applied economics, 19(3): 321-42. 
Gingrich, Jane, and Silja Häusermann. 2015. "The decline of the working-class vote, the 
reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and the consequences for the welfare 
state." Journal of European Social Policy, 25(1): 50-75. 
Goebel, Jan, Markus M Grabka, Stefan Liebig, Martin Kroh, David Richter, Carsten 
Schröder, and Jürgen Schupp. 2019. "The German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP)." 
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 239(2): 345-60. 
Grabka, Markus M, and Christoph Halbmeier. 2019. "Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland 
bleibt trotz deutlich steigender Nettovermögen anhaltend hoch." DIW Wochenbericht, 
86(40): 735-45. 
Grabka, Markus M, Jan Marcus, and Eva Sierminska. 2015. "Wealth distribution within 
couples." Review of Economics of the Household, 13(3): 459-86. 
Grabka, Markus M, and Christian Westermeier. 2014. "Persistently high wealth inequality in 
Germany." DIW Economic Bulletin, 4(6): 3-15. 
Hipp, Lena, Janine Bernhardt, and Jutta Allmendinger. 2015. "Institutions and the prevalence 
of nonstandard employment." Socio-Economic Review, 13(2): 351-77. 
Jann, Ben. 2008. "The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition for linear regression models." The 
Stata Journal, 8(4): 453-79. 
Killewald, Alexandra, Fabian T Pfeffer, and Jared N Schachner. 2017. "Wealth Inequality and 
Accumulation." Annual review of sociology, 43: 379-404. 
Kitagawa, Evelyn M. 1955. "Components of a difference between two rates." Journal of the 
American statistical Association, 50(272): 1168-94. 
Kocka, Jürgen. 1980. "The study of social mobility and the formation of the working class in 
the 19th century." Le mouvement social, 111: 97-117. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1989. "New social movements and the new class in the Netherlands." 
American Journal of Sociology, 94(5): 1078-116. 
Kulich, Clara, Grzegorz Trojanowski, Michelle K Ryan, S Alexander Haslam, and Luc DR 
Renneboog. 2011. "Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender 
disparities in executive remuneration." Strategic Management Journal, 32(3): 301-21. 
Kurz, Karin. 2004. "Home ownership and social inequality in West Germany." In Home 
ownership and social inequality in comparative perspective, edited by Karin Kurz and 
Hans-Peter Blossfeld, pp. 21-60. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Lambert, Paul S, and Erik Bihagen. 2014. "Using occupation-based social classifications." 
Work, Employment and Society, 28(3): 481-94. 
Lechmann, Daniel SJ, and Claus Schnabel. 2012. "Why is there a gender earnings gap in 
self-employment? A decomposition analysis with German data." IZA Journal of 
European Labour Studies, 1(6): 1-25. 
Lersch, Philipp. 2017. "The Marriage Wealth Premium Revisited." Demography, 54(3): 961–
83. 
Lersch, Philipp M, Marita Jacob, and Karsten Hank. 2017. "Parenthood, gender, and 
personal wealth." European Sociological Review, 33(3): 410-22. 
Minkus, Lara. 2019. "Labour market closure and the stalling of the gender pay gap." 1049. 
 
 





Minkus, Lara, and Anne Busch-Heizmann. 2018. "Gender Wage Inequalities Between 
Historical Heritage and Structural Adjustments: A German–German Comparison Over 
Time." Social Politics, 27(1): 156-86. 
Minkus, Lara, and Anne Busch-Heizmann. 2020. "Gender Wage Inequalities Between 
Historical Heritage and Structural Adjustments: A German-German Comparison Over 
Time." Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 1(27): 156 - 
86. 
Mohan, Nancy, and John Ruggiero. 2003. "Compensation differences between male and 
female CEOs for publicly traded firms: a nonparametric analysis." Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 54(12): 1242-48. 
Müller, Walter, and Richard Arum. 2004. "Self-employment dynamics in advanced 
economies." In The reemergence of self-employment: A comparative study of self-
employment dynamics and social inequality, edited by Richard Arum and Walter 
Müller, pp. 1-35. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Nelson, Julie A. 2015. "Are women really more risk‐averse than men? A re‐analysis of the 
literature using expanded methods." Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(3): 566-85. 
Nelson, Julie A. 2016. "Not-so-strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking." Feminist 
Economics, 22(2): 114-42. 
Oaxaca, Ronald. 1973. "Male-female wage differentials in urban labour markets." 
International economic review, 14(3): 693-709. 
OECD. 2017. The Pursuit of Gender Equality-An Uphill Battle. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Oesch, Daniel. 2006. Redrawing the Class Map. Stratification and Institutions in Britain, 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Oesch, Daniel. 2008. "The Changing Shape of Class Voting. An individual-level analysis of 
party support in Britain, Germany and Switzerland." European Societies, 10(3): 329-
55. 
Palier, Bruno, and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. "Institutionalizing dualism: Complementarities and 
change in France and Germany." Politics & Society, 38(1): 119-48. 
Pfeffer, Fabian T. 2011. "Status Attainment and Wealth in the United States and Germany." 
In Persistence, Privilege and Parenting. The Comparative Study of Intergenerational 
Mobility, edited by Timothy M. Smeeding, Robert Erikson, and Markus Jäntti, pp. 109-
37. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Pfeffer, Fabian T., and Nora Waitkus. 2020. "The Wealth Inequality of Nations." LWS 
Working Paper Series, 33. 
Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Ravazzini, Laura, and Jenny Chesters. 2018. "Inequality and wealth: comparing the gender 
wealth gap in Switzerland and Australia." Feminist Economics, 24(4): 83-107. 
Ravazzini, Laura, and Ursina Kuhn. 2018. "Wealth, Savings and Children Among Swiss, 
German and Australian Families." In Social Dynamics in Swiss Society, edited, pp. 
161-74: Springer. 
Rubin, Donald B. 1996. "Multiple imputation after 18+ years." Journal of the American 
statistical Association, 91(434): 473-89. 
Ruel, Erin, and Robert M Hauser. 2013. "Explaining the gender wealth gap." Demography, 
50(4): 1155-76. 
Schneebaum, Alyssa, Miriam Rehm, Katharina Mader, and Katarina Hollan. 2018. "The 
gender wealth gap across European countries." Review of Income and Wealth, 64(2): 
295-331. 
Schubert, Renate, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler, and Hans Wolfgang Brachinger. 1999. 
"Financial decision-making: are women really more risk-averse?" American Economic 
Review, 89(2): 381-85. 
Sierminska, Eva M, Joachim R Frick, and Markus M Grabka. 2010. "Examining the gender 
wealth gap." Oxford Economic Papers, 62(4): 669-90. 
Sierminska, Eva, Daniela Piazzalunga, and Markus Grabka. 2019. "Transitioning Towards 
More Equality? Wealth Gender Differences and the Changing Role of Explanatory 
Factors Over Time." SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, 1050. 
 
 





Sunden, Annika E, and Brian J Surette. 1998. "Gender differences in the allocation of assets 
in retirement savings plans." The American Economic Review, 88(2): 207-11. 
Szydlik, Marc. 2004. "Inheritance and inequality: Theoretical reasoning and empirical 
evidence." European Sociological Review, 20(1): 31-45. 
Waitkus, Nora, and Olaf Groh-Samberg. 2018. "Beyond Meritocracy. Wealth accumulation in 
the German Upper Classes." In New Directions in Elite Studies, edited by Olav 
Korsnes, Johs Hjellbrekke, Johan Heilbron, Felix Bühlmann, and Mike Savage, pp. 
198-220. London: Routledge. 
Warren, Tracey. 2006. "Moving beyond the gender wealth gap: On gender, class, ethnicity, 
and wealth inequalities in the United Kingdom." Feminist Economics, 12(1-2): 195-
219. 
Warren, Tracey, Karen Rowlingson, and Claire Whyley. 2001. "Female finances: Gender 
wage gaps and gender assets gaps." Work, Employment and Society, 15(3): 465-88. 
Yamokoski, Alexis, and Lisa A Keister. 2006. "The wealth of single women: Marital status 
and parenthood in the asset accumulation of young baby boomers in the United 
States." Feminist Economics, 12(1-2): 167-94. 
Yu, Wei-hsin. 2017. "Tradeoff or Winner Take All? Relationships between Job Security and 











Figure A.1. Unconditional Quantile Regression with different self-employed groups
 












Figure A.2. Unconditional Quantile Regression excluding business equity from net wealth 
measure 
 
Note: SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. Reference is workers. Not weighted.
 
 





Figure A.3. Unconditional Quantile Regression with SES instead of Oesch classes
 
Note: SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. Reference is low SES. Not weighted
 
 





Figure A.4. Unconditional Quantile Regression, married vs. non-married individuals 
  
 
Note: SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. Reference is workers. Not weighted.
 
 





Figure A.5.  Explained part of the decomposition, only Oesch classes and explained 
percentages depicted (women as benchmark coefficients) 
 
 
Note: SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. Categorical option employed (grand-mean over 
occupational class categories). Not weighted.
 
 





Table A.1. Oesch 8-Class Scheme with example occupations 































































































Note: Dashed lines indicate where we collapse the class scheme for the empirical analysis. 










Table A.2. Wealth Gap within detailed Oesch classes 
Oesch-classes Wealth median men (Euro) Wealth median women (Euro) Wealth Gap (Euro) N (men) N (women) 
Large employer & self-employed 
professions 
263,635 109,417 154,217*** 621 368 
Petite bourgeoisie 133,500 62,956 70,544*** 1179 707 
Technical experts 70,997 58,093 12,904* 3362 1182 
Managers 90,166 41,189 48,977*** 3976 4278 
Socio-cultural professions 58,744 36,204 22,539*** 1605 4263 
Manual workers 15,520 8,674 6,846** 6659 1340 
Office workers 37,451 31,521 5,929 1399 3204 
Service workers 7,419 6,309 1,110 1819 4760 
SOEP.v35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Not weighted.
 
 





Table A.3. Results from Unconditional Quantile Regressions  
 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 90th percentile 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Class position                  
Workers (ref) 
Self-employed 1.81*** (0.32) 2.02*** (0.22) 1.12*** (0.12) 1.30*** (0.09) 0.65*** (0.07) 1.17*** (0.06) 0.65*** (0.09) 1.60*** (0.08) 
Technical experts 1.12*** (0.27) 1.29*** (0.17) 0.93*** (0.11) 0.54*** (0.06) 0.30*** (0.06) 0.23*** (0.04) 0.07 (0.06) 0.07 (0.04) 
Managers 1.09*** (0.19) 1.28*** (0.15) 0.44*** (0.07) 0.58*** (0.06) 0.21*** (0.04) 0.30*** (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04) 
Socio-cult. prof. 0.78*** (0.21) 0.94*** (0.24) 0.22** (0.08) 0.28** (0.09) 0.11* (0.04) 0.13* (0.06) -0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.07) 
Class position (Partner)                 
Workers (ref) 
Self-employed 0.31 (0.28) 0.23 (0.24) 0.43*** (0.10) 0.37*** (0.10) 0.61*** (0.06) 0.29*** (0.07) 0.64*** (0.07) 0.33*** (0.09) 
Professionals 1.32*** (0.20) 0.56*** (0.14) 0.65*** (0.07) 0.34*** (0.06) 0.43*** (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 0.20*** (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 
Not working -1.19*** (0.28) -0.37* (0.15) -0.38*** (0.10) -0.08 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.08* (0.04) 0.03 (0.06) 0.09* (0.04) 
No Information -0.08 (0.24) 0.20 (0.18) 0.06 (0.08) 0.26*** (0.07) 0.28*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.21*** (0.04) 0.13* (0.05) 
Transfers                 
No inheritance/gifts (ref) 
Inheritance/gifts  1.11** (0.32) 1.10*** (0.22) 0.75*** (0.13) 0.50*** (0.09) 0.26*** (0.07) 0.10 (0.06) 0.13 (0.08) 0.12 (0.08) 
Inheritance/gifts n.a. 0.84** (0.29) 0.33 (0.23) 0.27* (0.11) 0.12 (0.09) 0.11 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.05 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) 
Human capital and 
income 
                
Monthly labour inc. (IHS) 0.63*** (0.11) 0.89*** (0.11) 0.17*** (0.04) 0.41*** (0.04) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.23*** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.27*** (0.03) 
Monthly transfer inc. (IHS) -0.11** (0.04) -0.10* (0.04) -0.03* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Monthly pension inc. (IHS) 0.01 (0.07) 0.27*** (0.06) -0.02 (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Full-time work exp. (years) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.06*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 
Part-time work exp. (years) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 
Unemployment (years) -0.48*** (0.04) -0.43*** (0.04) -0.11*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 
Job Tenure (years) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 
Weekly work hours -0.02** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.00* (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 
Education (years) 0.46*** (0.03) 0.41*** (0.03) 0.19*** (0.01) 0.16*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 
Firm size                 
200-1999 employees (ref) 
< 20 employees and self-
employed w/o employees 
0.59** (0.18) -0.15 (0.16) 0.21** (0.07) 0.08 (0.06) 0.11** (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.08* (0.04) 0.08* (0.04) 
 
 





20-199 employees 0.46* (0.19) -0.06 (0.16) 0.03 (0.07) -0.06 (0.05) -0.05 (0.04) -0.11*** (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) -0.09* (0.04) 
> 2000 employees 0.16 (0.20) -0.07 (0.14) -0.06 (0.07) -0.05 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 
Sectoral structure                 
Public sector (=1) 0.30 (0.17) 0.10 (0.15) 0.11 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) 0.01 (0.04) -0.14*** (0.04) -0.06 (0.03) -0.20*** (0.04) 
Bank and insurance sector (ref) 
Health, social, retail, and 
hospitality sector 
-1.43*** (0.22) -0.98*** (0.17) -0.43*** (0.08) -0.24*** (0.06) -0.18*** (0.04) -0.08* (0.04) -0.09* (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) 
Manufacturing sector 0.49 (0.30) 0.43* (0.21) 0.45*** (0.13) 0.38*** (0.08) 0.24** (0.08) 0.18** (0.06) 0.14 (0.08) 0.12 (0.08) 
Other services -0.92*** (0.22) -0.67*** (0.13) -0.42*** (0.09) -0.30*** (0.05) -0.19*** (0.05) -0.14*** (0.03) -0.12** (0.04) -0.08* (0.03) 
Family                 
# children in household  -0.05 (0.08) -0.12* (0.05) 0.13*** (0.03) 0.13*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.05** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 
Married and cohabiting  (ref) 
Married - living separately -2.49*** (0.44) -1.95*** (0.40) -1.21*** (0.15) -0.89*** (0.14) -0.51*** (0.07) -0.28*** (0.08) -0.19** (0.07) -0.14 (0.10) 
Non-married -1.54*** (0.22) -0.41* (0.19) -1.29*** (0.09) -0.54*** (0.07) -0.51*** (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) -0.20*** (0.04) 0.05 (0.05) 
Divorced -3.00*** (0.27) -2.07*** (0.24) -1.60*** (0.09) -0.96*** (0.09) -0.63*** (0.05) -0.32*** (0.05) -0.27*** (0.05) -0.11 (0.06) 
Widowed -0.93 (0.58) -1.31 (0.71) -0.17 (0.21) -0.42 (0.29) 0.19 (0.13) -0.01 (0.20) 0.35* (0.15) 0.35 (0.27) 
# siblings -0.18*** (0.04) -0.12*** (0.03) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 
Parental education                 
Low education (ref) 
No degree/don't know/else -1.30*** (0.25) -1.45*** (0.21) -0.25** (0.08) -0.44*** (0.07) -0.08 (0.04) -0.17*** (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) 
Intermediate education -0.35* (0.17) -0.29* (0.15) -0.02 (0.06) -0.12* (0.05) 0.00 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) 0.09** (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 
Higher education -0.22 (0.20) 0.15 (0.14) -0.11 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.17*** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 
Controls                 
East Germany (=1) -0.49** (0.17) -0.44** (0.14) -0.71*** (0.06) -0.58*** (0.05) -0.61*** (0.03) -0.58*** (0.03) -0.52*** (0.03) -0.48*** (0.03) 
Migration Background (=1) -1.53*** (0.24) -0.94*** (0.18) -0.37*** (0.08) -0.33*** (0.06) -0.26*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04) -0.13** (0.04) -0.14*** (0.04) 
Age (20 - 34 years) (ref) 
Age (35 - 49 years) 1.91*** (0.24) 1.47*** (0.21) 1.16*** (0.08) 0.60*** (0.07) 0.43*** (0.04) 0.09* (0.04) 0.16*** (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) 
Age (50 - 64 years) 2.04*** (0.33) 0.36 (0.31) 1.69*** (0.12) 0.50*** (0.11) 0.96*** (0.07) 0.33*** (0.07) 0.62*** (0.07) 0.34*** (0.08) 
Wealth imput. flag (=1) 2.27*** (0.07) 1.47*** (0.05) 0.47*** (0.03) 0.33*** (0.02) 0.17*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant -5.27*** (0.94) -7.52*** (0.80) 5.80*** (0.27) 3.64*** (0.29) 9.76*** (0.16) 8.14*** (0.20) 10.8*** (0.18) 9.09*** (0.26) 
Number of person-years 20.462 20.620 20.462 20.620 20.462 20.620 20.462 20.620 
         
SOEP.V35 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Not weighted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
 
 







i Note, that we understand occupational classes as families or individuals who share the 
same economic position and have latent or manifest interests resulting from this position 
(Kocka 1980; Oesch 2006). We are not engaging with social classes that further share 
collective identities through the formation of organizations, class consciousness, and 
solidarity (Kocka 1980).  
 
ii Next to earnings dynamics, differences in saving and therefore wealth inequality are the 
results of intergenerational transmission of bequests and human capital, differences in 
preferences, rates of returns, entrepreneurship, and medical expense risk (De Nardi/Fella 
2017: 281).  
 
iii We thank an anonymous reviewer for this argument.  
 
iv By job security we mean all kinds of job characteristics that are particularly prevalent 
among precarious or atypical work arrangements, such as low-wage employment, temporary 
employment, part time or marginal employment. In all these categories women constitute the 
majority in Germany, as the male-breadwinner model and tax breaks incentivize them to take 
up this kind of work. Hence, we conclude that women have lower job security than men (Hipp 
et al. 2015; OECD 2017; Palier/Thelen 2010). Whether women trade job security for lower 
wages has been debunked by recent comparative research (for example Yu 2017),  
 
v Although the lower reliance on a specific employer could also result in more power 
resources for women (and thereby lowering their income risk), the opposite seems more 
likely as illustrated by indicators such as lower average earnings and pension integration 
(see Oesch 2006).  
 
vi SOEP oversamples migrant households, low-income households, high income households, 
households with children, and east German households (Goebel et al. 2019).  
 
vii To take the sectoral structure into account, we introduce industry categories. We 
differentiate between typically male industries (manufacturing sector), mixed industries 
(banking and insurance sector), and female industries (health, care, retail, and hospitality 
sector) and other sectors (c.f. Minkus and Busch-Heizmann 2020). 
 
viii The SOEP does not ask for inheritance in 2017. Therefore, people who entered the 
survey after 2012 were coded as “not applicable”. If we had earlier information on inheritance 
and gifts, we imputed that information from earlier years to 2017.   
 
ix It is particularly noteworthy that confidence intervals and standard errors at the 25th 
percentile are large compared to the other points of the wealth distribution, indicating that 
coefficients are not estimated as efficiently as in the other percentiles. Therefore, we interpret 










x The covariate at quantile τth indicates a marginal effect of a small location shift in the 
distribution of covariates, keeping everything else constant (see Borah/Basu 2013: 9).  
 
xi Differentiating the self-employed into those who own large companies, self-employed 
professionals, and the petite bourgeoisie (e.g. small shop owners) (Appendix Figure A.1), 
reveals that wealth gap exists for employers with employees, the self-employed 
professionals as well as the petite bourgeoisie. But only at the 90th percentile, these 
differences are statistically significant for men and women across different forms of self-
employment. 
 
xii To circumvent problem of the omitted base category, we transformed categorical variables 
in the decomposition in order to interpret them with reference to their grand mean and not to 
the base category “workers”. Thus, corresponding rif-coefficients of men’s point estimates 
from Table A.3 still serve as the benchmark but need to be transformed when calculating 
results of the decomposition for categorical variables. For example, with regard to self-
employed in the 50th quantile, men’s rif-coefficient (1.3024404) needs to be subtracted from 
the grand mean of the Oesch rif-coefficients 
([1.3024404+0.54480372+0.58540863+0.27858174+0] +/5=0.5422469). Therefore, the 
coefficients of self-employed in the 50th quantile serving as benchmark in the decomposition 
amounts to 0.7601935 (1.3024404-0.5422469). Correspondingly we calculate the 
decomposition estimate depicted in the explained part in Table 2 at the 50th percentile by 
carrying out the following estimation: (0.0872939-0.0525364) x (0.7601935) = 0.02642243.  
 
